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The Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 v. The First Amendment
by SCOTT SIBARY*
This past year has been perhaps the most eventful in the
history of cable television regulation. Since the first system
was built in 1949,1 cable television technology has evolved to
make cable one of the major media of mass communication today. Along with this development of cable television, a parallel
interest has developed on the part of many to regulate it.
Partly due to a 1982 Supreme Court case affecting the liability
of municipalities regulating cable television,2 regulation of
cable has been the recent topic of congressional legislation.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 19843 (CCPA) for the
first time establishes a statutory system for the regulation of
cable television, and defines the roles to be played by the federal, state, and local governments.
This legislation is not the first word on the regulation of
cable television, nor is it likely to be the last. The FCC started
placing restrictions on the construction and operation of cable
systems in the 1960's. 4 Since then, the use and nature of cable
has changed dramatically. Current estimates put cable penetration (number of television households in the United States
subscribing to cable) at over forty-five percent.' With the increasing use of cable, some have argued that it is a media resource that should be made available as a forum for the public
at large.' These commentators argue that the structure of
* A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1975; J.D./M.B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1980; Assistant Professor, California State University, Chico.
1. H. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4655, 4657.
2. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (Boulder 1). The Court held that home-rule status does not render a city's actions exempt
under the antitrust laws. Therefore, municipalities need express authorization from
their state or from the federal government for anti-competitive regulatory activities
(such as allowing only one cable television system to operate in the city).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
4. First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
5. BROADCASTING, Nov. 19, 1984, at 11.
6. See, e.g., Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access
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cable lends itself well to public access, yet also presents the possibility of becoming a monopoly that could effectively limit access by the public.'
Today, state-of-the-art cable systems offer 108 channels.8
This means that a cable system owner may allocate several
channels for use by private groups or individuals, governmental
bodies, educational institutions, or businesses and still have
more available for the owner's use than was possible years ago.
Likewise, the great number of channels available over one system presents the possibility that the public, in any given locality, would be unwilling to support more than one cable system,
and that the nation as a whole could come to rely on cable as
the comprehensive (and nearly exclusive) video source of information and entertainment. Those wishing their expression to
reach the public by video would have only one effective choice:
the existing cable system.
These issues of access and cable television regulation pose serious constitutional questions. Policies established and decisions made affecting the first amendment status of cable
television could determine the nature of the major media in the
future, and influence the extent to which our sources of information are open, unfettered, and unintimidated. This article
will examine the first amendment implications of regulating
cable television, with particular emphasis on an appraisal of the
CCPA. The first part of the article will provide an overview of
cable technology and other video media. Part II will summarize cable's regulatory history, as well as the case law on its first
amendment status. Part III will review the legislative history
of the CCPA. Part IV will analyze, in terms of the first amendment, the regulatory framework set up by the Act. Part V will
conclude that current laws, without the CCPA, are sufficient to
protect and promote the marketplace for mass communications
media.
Under the FirstAmendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1981); Comment, Public Access
to Cable Television, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1009 (1982); Note. The Invalidation of
Mandatory Cable Access Requirements: F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp.. 7 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 469 (1980); Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television. 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 607
(1981); But see Lee, Cable Franchisingand the First Amendment. 36 VAND. L. REV.
867 (1981); Henderson, Municipal Ownership of Cable Television: Some Issues and
Problems, 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 667 (1981).

7. Id
8. H. REP. No. 934, supra note 1, at 22.
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I
The Technology
The technology of cable television has changed dramatically
since the earliest systems were constructed. Nevertheless, the
basic structure remains similar to the early CATV (community
antenna television) systems. The system starts with a receiving
antenna located so as to receive clear signals from local broadcast antennas.9 The signals are "prepared" (Le., modulated) for
cable transmission at a nearby building called the "headend."' 0
The cable itself is a coaxial cable with a conductive wire core
couched in foam insulation, a conductive aluminum web, and
plastic sheathing. From there, the signals are sent over trunk
cable out into the community, where feeder cables take signals
from the trunk cables to nearby homes."1 The feeder cables are
tapped into with drop lines, which run into the homes and connect to the television sets.12 This basic structure for cable systems is widely used today, although improvements in
equipment have improved the quality of signal the subscriber
receives and increased the number of channels offered.13
The development of low-cost technology capable of importing signals from sources beyond the receiving potential of the
local antenna has led to many major changes in cable television.' 4 Microwave transmission has been available for many
years, but is costly because microwaves travel along the line-ofsight, requiring numerous facilities in order to cover great distances.' However, in 1975, RCA launched the first domestic
satellite, and others soon followed.'6 With dish antennas receiving signals from the satellites, cable systems became capable of receiving signals from anywhere in the world.' 7 This
potential has allowed syndicated programming to appear over
such networks as HBO, MTV, ESPN and CNN. The increase in
the number and type of programs available over cable also led
9. G. WEBE, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE

Tv

ION

3 (1983); W. BAER,

X.

BOTEIN, L JOHNSON, C. PILNC, M PRICE, & P. YIN, CABLE TELEISON: FRANCHISING CONSDERATIONS 4-5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BAER].

10. See BAER, aupr note 9,at 5-7.
11. I
12. IM

13. S. REP. NO. 67, 98th Cong, lst Sess. 4-5 (1983).
14. G. WEBB, eupm note 9, at 45.
15. Id

16. Id
17. Id
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to an increase in demand for cable.' 8 Even those television
viewers who had clear over-the-air signal reception were offered something they could not get before.
While improving technology enhances the quality of signals
received at the television set, there seem to be some inherent
disadvantages to cable systems. The cable itself tends to resist
electrical conduction so that as cable length increases, the signals noticeably weaken. 9 This is overcome by adding signal
amplifiers along the lines, but amplifiers tend to reduce the signal quality.' Better equipment reduces the problems, but adds
to the cost of the system. However, none of these problemstechnological or economic-presently pose a threat to cable's
commercial viability.21
In addition to improved reception and availability of distant
signals, there are a couple of other important features that
cable offers. One is two-way transmission, with the subscriber
sending back over the cable system responses to programming.2 Simpler response systems, such as videotext (electronic
delivery of textual information) currently are being developed.2 Two-way systems not involving the video aspects of
cable television, such as burglar and fire alarms, are already in
24

use.

The fourth major advantage offered by cable is the increased
opportunity for local programming. With the large number of
channels available over the more modern cable systems, cable
operators have provided channels for "local origination" programming.' This allows individuals to reach their communities over leased or public access channels. Disputes over the
legality of requiring a cable operator to provide public access
and leased access channels have a long history, and will be dis18. S. REP. No. 67, supra note 13, at 5.
19. BAER, supra note 9, at 10-11.
20. Id
21. Witness the continued strong growth of cable. See BROADCASTING, Nov. 19,
1984, at 11; J. WALTER THOMPSON U.S.A., INC., CABLE CAPSULES 4 (4th ed. 1984).
22. BAER, supra note 9, at 41-45.
23. G. WEBB, supra note 9, at 13-14; Cable TelecommunicationsAct of 1983: Hear-

inps on S. 66 Before the Subcomm. on Communicationsof the Senate CommL on Corn-

merce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
24. G. WEBB, supra, note 9, at 13-14; Senate Hearing,supra note 23, at 58-59.
25. J. WALTER THoMPSON U.S.A., INc., upra note 21, at 10. Local origination programming has increased its share of cable viewing audiences from 8 percent in November 1982 to 12 percent by December 1983. IE
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cussed at greater length later in this article.2
To put the development of cable technology and the issue of
cable regulation into proper perspective, potentially competitive electronic media must be considered. The technology for
every medium changes with time, and as it advances, so does
the impact and relative importance of the various media. Cable
has several major competitors in the field of video
communications.
A.

Broadcasting

Even with the recent explosion of cable systems in operation,
broadcast television remains a major competitor to cable television. At the same time, however, the two media benefit each
other. Broadcast stations are carried over cable systems,
thereby increasing the number of homes reached by the broadcasting stations while also increasing the cable systems' offerings. This is particularly true for independent stations, stations
that would not otherwise reach beyond their local audiences.
In addition to traditional broadcasting, there are subscription
television (STV), low-power television (LPTV), and teletext.
These should be grouped with traditional broadcast media because they operate on assigned broadcast frequencies and do
not require any new type of antenna for reception. ' STV typically broadcasts scrambled signals over local UHF (ultra-high
frequency, 470 to 890 MHz, as compared to 54 to 216 MMz for
VHF) stations.28 The subscriber pays a fee for a decoder, which
also has the advantageous feature of allowing charges to be assessed on a pay-per-view (PPV) basis. In recent years STV has
grown rapidly and some expect this trend to continue.2
LPTV stations are simply broadcast stations with a shorter
broadcasting radius than full-power stations. By licensing
LPTV stations in areas in which the range of an additional fullpower station (approximately 70 miles) would overlap with existing stations, more broadcasting can become available in the
given locality. As of late 1984, the FCC had licensed over 250
LPTV stations and had about 27,000 applications pending. °
X See infra Parts n throug IV.
27. G. WEBB, upra note 9, at 16-20.
29. Senate Hearing,supra note 23 at 50-52; but ee
at 46-47 (predicting a downward trend for STV).
3o. BROADCAfnN% Oct. 1, 1984, at 8L

BROADCASTNG,

Oct. 15, 1984,
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Another developing feature that has the potential to enhance
broadcast offerings is teletext. Similar to videotext, teletext
consists of textual material inserted in the horizontal spacing
band of the television picture.31 Its drawbacks are that the television needs an adaptor to insert the text onto the screen, and
the transmission,
which is slower than videotext, is only one2
way.

s

B. Multi-Point Distribution Service (MDS)
MDS is basically broadcasting at microwave frequencies.U3
For reception, the subscribing viewer needs a microwave antenna and a clear line of site to the transmitting antenna.34
Since MDS does not require an extensive system of facilities,
some expect that if the FCC allows multichannel MDS, it will
become a powerful competitor to pay cable in urban areasM
Recently, the FCC decided to allocate by lottery about 1000
four-channel MDS permits.3
C.

Telephone
When telephone companies convert from the present copper
wire cables to fiber optic lines, they gain the capacity to transmit video signals. Although the CCPA generally prohibits
companies from simultaneously offering telephone and video
services, telephone companies could allow others to offer video
services over their cables.3 Given the telephone companies'
existing facilities, this potential is enormous. In fact, a videotext service is already offered over telephone lines in an area of
southern California.38
D.

Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV)

SMATV consists of an antenna that receives signals from
satellites and transmits these via cable to nearby television
sets. 9 The typical master antenna will be placed on the roof of
an apartment building or near an apartment complex, and
31. G. WEBS, supra note 9, at 16-17.
32. I
33. Senate Hearing,supra note 23, at 33.

34. G. WEBB, upra note 9, at 17-18.
35. Senate Hearing, upra note 23, at 33.
36. BROADCASTING, Nov. 26, 1984, at 37.

37. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(b) 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
38. BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1984, at 100.

39. G. WEB%

supra note 9, at 15.
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serve the residents of the apartments. 40 SMATV has the potential to operate like a cable system, and service more than one
building or complex, by linking with other master antennas
and SMATV systems via microwave or cable.41 One SMATV
operator in Dallas has been allowed to construct a 98-channel
system by linking a cluster of apartments by microwave.' 2
E. Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS)
DBS could become an even more popular source of video programming than cable. With small dish antennas, viewers can
pick up signals from satellites anywhere in the viewing sky.43
By pointing at different satellites, the antenna receives signals
for different selections of channels. Typically, one DBS offers
two to six channels." Although some signals are scrambled,
and all may be scrambled eventually, the owners of the satellites or of the programming can make decoders available.4 The
limitations on DBS at present lie in the strength of the signal.
The transmitters can be made more powerful (which is costly),
the electromagnetic bandwidth of the signal can be increased
(which reduces the number of channels that can be transmitted), the focusing beam can be narrowed (which reduces the
area served) or the antenna can be improved.'0 Advances in
the first and last of these options are increasing the potential of
DBS.4'7 Large dish antennas, which are cumbersome, costly and
unsightly, are being supplanted by smaller dish antennas.48
Currently, a small, flat, rectangular-shaped antenna is being
developed which would further enhance the attractiveness of
DBS.'0 Once these developments become economically feasible, DBS will be able to spread from its stronghold in rural areas, where cable is less cost-effective, into urban areas.
40. Id.

41. Id; See Senate Hearing,supra note 23, at 57.
42. Cable Dallas, Inc., 93 F.C.C.2d 20, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 651 (1982). The
ruling allowed the SMATV operator to use microwave transmission facilities to link
the apartment building clusters.

43.
44.
45.
4.

Senate Hearing,supra note 23, at 57.

Id
Id at 6l.
G. WnM, supra note 9, at 15-16.

47. BROADCASM% OcL 1, 1984, at 41-43.

48. Id at 42-4
49. Id
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F. Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs)
VCRs need to be mentioned here because they have the potential of enhancing whatever video medium the viewer receives. Programming available by broadcast, cable, satellite, or
microwave may not be aired at a time convenient for a particular viewer. With the ability to record programming, the viewer
effectively increases his or her options from the viewing source.
Retail outlets also sell and rent video recordings. Thus, a VCR
coupled with a subscription to a DBS, MDS, or STV service
(plus whatever non-subscription broadcasting is available) provides an attractive alternative to cable.

II
The Developing Legal Status of Cable
A. Cable Television Cases
As had been the case with radio, the mere development of
cable television systems did not prompt the FCC to take regulatory action. In fact, despite urging by broadcasters, the FCC
declined to regulate cable in 1956. The FCC determined that
under the Communications Act of 1934-the FCC's authorizing
legislation--cable systems could not be considered common
carriers.51
In the following years, however, cable systems began to "import" signals from distant broadcasters via microwave transmission facilities. These facilities were deemed subject to FCC
regulation.5" This, however, was only the first step for the
FCC. In 1965, it asserted jurisdiction over all microwave-fed
cable systems.5 In 1966, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over all
cable systems.M The order required mandatory carriage of local signals and prohibited importation of distant signals into the
top 100 markets (in the United States) absent a showing that
the importation would be in the public interest.5 This proved
burdensome for cable operators, and stifled growth of cable sys50. S. REP.No. 67, supra note 13, at 8.
51. ICE
52. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd, Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 357 U&.
951 (1963).
53. First Report and Order in Docket Nos. 14895 and 15233 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
54. Second Report and Order in Docket Nos. 14895, 15233, and 15971, 2 F.C.C.2d
725, aff4 Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
55. Id.
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terns in the top 100 markets.5 When this new assertion of authority was challenged in court on statutory grounds, the
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's need to exercise jurisdiction
over cable as "reasonably ancillary" to its role of regulating and
protecting broadcast television. 57
Regulation continued. The FCC placed more extensive requirements on cable systems in 1969.58 The Commission mandated that the larger systems-those with more than 3500
subscribers-produce local programming.59 The Commission
also decreed that cable systems were subject to the equal time
requirements and the fairness doctrine.Y° Again, the FCC action withstood challenge, but this time by a divided court. In
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., a four-judge plurality
agreed that the FCC's actions were reasonably ancillary to the
regulation of broadcasting.6
Though the FCC came out with another set of regulations in
197 2 ,6' the tide had already begun to turn away from more extensive regulation. The growth of cable, and its technological
development, brought an increasing element of journalism into
cable operations and programming. That portion of the 1972
regulations requiring cable systems in the largest 100 markets
to have a 20-or-more channel capacity and to provide four access channels for public, educational, local, government and
leased access use" was determined by the Supreme Court to
infringe on journalistic independence.s The holding in that
case, however, was based solely on the Communications Act of
19 34 .'6 The Court declined to determine the first amendment
status of cable television.6
Recently, the Court had another opportunity to address this
56. S. REP. No. 67, aupra note 13, at 8.
57. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
5X First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969), repealed,Report and Order on
Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
59. Id.

60. Id
61. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).

62. Id
63.
64.
65.
66.

Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
Id at 194.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 US. 689 (1979).
ISLat 700-L 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976) provides that "a person engaged in radio

broadcasting shall not... be deemed a common carrier."

67. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in 1979, the FCC had begun to modify and eliminate its regulations of cable systems. See, ea, S. REP. No. 67, supra note
1.%at 9.
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issue.' Operators of cable television systems in Oklahoma
challenged a state law prohibiting advertisements for most alcoholic beverages. 69 While the Federal District Court granted
summary judgment on the grounds that the ban violated the
first amendment,7 0 the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the
ban was a valid restriction on commercial speech.71 The
Supreme Court, however, directed the petitioners to address
the question of possible federal preemption of state law.72 Specifically declining to reach the first amendment question,7 the
Court held that the state law was preempted by the federal regulatory framework administered by the FCC.74
Unlike the Supreme Court, several lower courts have addressed the first amendment status of cable television. In Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FC, 5 the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed certain FCC rules restricting programming on cable
television. After noting that "differences in the characteristics
of news media justify differences in the first amendment standards applied to them,"76 the court determined that the rationale used for regulation "cannot be directly applied to cable
television because an essential precondition of that theoryphysical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role
for government-is absent." 77 The court applied the test set
out in United States v. O'Brien'7 holding that the FCC made no
showing of an important or substantial governmental interest
that would justify prior restraint of first amendment speech.7 9
One year later, the Eighth Circuit, in Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC,s8 held that the FCC exceeded its authority by requiring
cable system operations to provide public access channels. In
dictum, the court said that the first amendment requires a
68.
69.
(West
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, - U.S.., 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
OKLA. CONST., art. XXVII, § 5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37,
Supp. 1982).
104 S. Ct. at 2699.
Id.; 699 F.2d 490, 500-502 (10th Cir. 1983).
- U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983).
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2709 n. 16 (1984).
Io at 2703-05.
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
Id at 43.

Id at 2698;

77. Id.
at 44.45.
78. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
79. 567 F.2d at 49-51.

80. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).

§ 516
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court to closely scrutinize the Commission's decisions affecting
communications because
assessment of the proper balance of first amendment rights
must be based on a record, not merely on argument regarding
precedent or on resort to an "objectives" rubric. Government
.control of business operations must be most closely scrutinized
when it affects communication of information and ideas, and
prior restraints in those circumstances are presumptively invalid. ...
In wresting from cable operators the control of pri
vately owned facilities for transmission of programs not
acquired from public airwaves, the Commission makes no effort to show that action to have been necessary to protect a
"clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger," or to show "the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests [which would] give
occasion for permissible limitation."'

According to the Eighth Circuit, "the Commission appears to
have 'minimized the difficult problems' created by its access
rules, and thus 'failed to come to grips' with the important first
amendment considerations present-'the risk of an enlargement of Government control over the content of [cablecast] discussion of public issues.'

"I

A different approach was taken by the Tenth Circuit in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder (Boulder II).3
That case involved an attempt by the city to restrict the cable
company's operations to one area of the city, even though the
franchise agreement allowed the company to operate anywhere
within the city limits." The district court, in its preliminary
findings in Boulder I sa (a decision based primarily on antitrust
law) and Boulder H determined that competition between cable
companies in Boulder was possible. 86 In Boulder II, however,
the Tenth Circuit ignored these findings and upheld the city's
actions. The court reasoned that cable's use of public rights-ofway, eventual physical limitations on the number of cables that
could be strung on poles or laid underground and an economic
tendency toward the monopolization of cable in Boulder could
81. I/ at 1053-54 (citations omitted).

82. AL
83. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cr. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
84. Idat 1372.

85. Community mmuncation Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035,1038-40
(D. Colo.), rv'd, 630 Fd 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
86. 496 F. Supp. 823,830 (D. Colo. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), wrt
dismised, 456 US. 1001 (1982).
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justify restricting cable systems to protect the interests of the
viewing public.7 However, the Circuit Court remanded the
case for factual findings88
One year later, in Omega Satellite Productsv. City of Indianapolis,"e the Seventh Circuit made "tentative" findings that the
first amendment was not violated by a city's franchising process. 90 While taking an approach similar to that taken by the
Tenth Circuit in Boulder II, the Seventh Circuit added an argument. The court noted that the fundamental reason for regulating broadcasting is to prevent frequency interference. 91 The
court viewed the use of pole space or space in underground
ducts as interfering with other users of those poles or ducts.9
Although the parallel is rough at best, it does attempt to respond to the argument that without electromagnetic frequency
interference, regulation of broadcasting would not be necessary
or permissible (and perhaps would never have developed). 3
The opinion does, however, generally rely on the same reasoning expressed in Boulder II.
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit in PreferredCommunications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles", took issue with some of
the arguments expressed in Boulder II. In this case, Preferred
Communications (PC) did not participate in the city's auction
process for awarding the city's cable franchise96 The city subsequently denied PC's application for a permit to construct
a
9
cable system in the city, and the company brought suit. 7
87. 660 F.2d at 1376-80. In Crisp, the Tenth Circuit used the balancing test applied
in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), to
determine that the important governmental interest in regulating alcohol justified
the restriction on the commercial speech involved in Crisp. 699 F.2d 490, 499-502
(1983). Thus, the Tenth Circuit did not address the first amendment rights of cable
television operators at that time.
88. 660 F.2d at 1380.
89. 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Id. at 127-29.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Id. Why this Interference, if it exists, cannot be cured by providing additional
pole space or ducts, rather than by restricting or extinguishing a person's right to
speak, is not explained.
93. If there was no frequency interference, yet broadcast frequencies remained
scarce, the marketplace would allocate these "scarce resources" and decide who would
be permitted to speak (as happens with newspapers).
94. 694 F.2d at 128.
95. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. Id at 1402.
97. Id.

No. 3]

CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT

The trial court dismissed the suit without leave to amend."
The Ninth Circuit decided to hear the constitutional issue on
appeal, framing the question as whether the City could,
consistent with the first amendment, limit access by means of
an auction process to a given region of the City to a single cable
television company, when the public utility facilities and other
public property in that region necessary to the installation and
operation of a cable television system are physically capable of
accomodating more than one system?"
The Tenth Circuit argument that cable "significantly impact[s] the public domain in order to operateC and that] without
a license, it cannot engage in cable broadcasting"' °° was rejected by the Ninth Circuit. 01 The latter court held that the
city must prove that the elements of the O'Brien test °2 have
been met, rather than simply asserting that an impact on the
public domain necessitates restricting access to the cable market.0 s Indeed, the court indicated that the "impact" argument
would not pass the test. °4
At least two other federal district courts, however, have followed the lead of the Tenth Circuit in Boulder I. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky relied on the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Boulder II as well as a
1972 case that found community antenna television to be a natural monopoly.1° 5 The district court said that because of the
asserted tendency of cable toward a natural monopoly, no first
amendment concerns were raised by the denial of a franchise
o Similarly, the federal
after a competitive bidding process. 1°
98. Id. at 1399.
99. Id. at 1401. For purposes of the appeal, the court assumed as true plaintiff's
allegations that more than one company could physically serve the city and that there
is no natural monopoly in cable television in Los Angeles. Id. at 1404.

100. 660 F.2d at 1379.
101. 754 F.2d at 1405-07.
102. 1. That the government regulation furthers an important or substantial state
interest; 2. The government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 3 The incidental restriction on the alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. United States v. O'Brien,

391 US. 367, 377 (1968).
103. Prferred Communictions,754 F.2d at 1405-07.
104. Id. at 1408.
105. Hopklnsvflle Cable TV, Inc v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543

(W.D. Ky. 1972).
106. Id. at 547. Aside from the merits of this argument, to be discussed in Part IV
Oift, it remains to be explained why regulation should be applied prospectivelywith the government choosing the monopolist--rather than after the public, through

the marketplace, has chosen the "winne."
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district court in Rhode Island held that "scarcity is scarcityits particular source, whether 'physical' or 'economic', does not
matter if its effect is to remove from all but a small group an
important means of expressing ideas."7 However, in Century
Federal v. City of Palo Alto,'"8 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California referred to these recent
cases but refused to draw, without a full trial, the same conclusions reached by the other two district courts. 1 "9
B. Related Case Law
The differences in approach taken by these courts is not due
solely to the lack of Supreme Court guidance on cable television's first amendment status. Similar uncertainty has been exhibited in decisions by the Court in cases involving broadcasting
and newspapers. In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. F1" 0 generally considered the leading case supporting content regulation of broadcasting, the Court upheld the FCC's "fairness
doctrine."1 "' Of greatest importance to cable television is the
Court's statement that "the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes
of the first amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 112
Later cases have yielded varying results on the issue of access
to broadcasting. The Court held in ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem v. Democratic National Committeel's that a guaranteed
right of access would interfere with the editorial discretion of
broadcasters. 114 But in Columbia Broadcasting System v.
FCC,115 the Court quoted Red Lion, holding that requiring access rights for candidates for federal office properly balanced
the first amendment interests of candidates, the public, and
broadcasters. 16 Recently, in FCC v. League of Women Vot107. Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 985-88 (D.R.. 1983).
108. 579 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
109. Id. at 1561-65.
110. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
111. Id. at 375,400-01. The doctrine requires that all sides of public issues 'be given
fair coverage." Id at 369.
112. Id. at 390.
113. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
114. Id. at 124-126.
115. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
116. Id. at 395, 397.
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the Court reviewed these three decisions. Although the
case involved federal restrictions on public broadcasting stations, the Court looked to Red Lion and its progeny in order to
clarify the standards to be applied to broadcasting.
At issue in League of Women Voters was the constitutionality of part of Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967.118 The part in controversy provided that "[n]o noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant
from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting under subpart C
of this part may engage in editorializing." 119
The Court began by reiterating that spectrum scarcity requires a different first amendment standard for broadcasting
than for newspapers, and imposes on the broadcaster a duty to
present "those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves."" The Court said that broadcast regulations do not need to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Drawing from Red Lion, the Court said that restrictions on a
broadcaster's freedom of speech need only be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, such as
ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues."'
The test is met by critically examining the interests on each
side: in other words, a type of balancing. 22 Referring to the
right of access granted to federal candidates in Columbia
BroadcastingSystem v. FCC, the Court stated that it constitutes
"a significant contribution to freedom of expression" without
impairing the "discretion of broadcasters to present their views
on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming.' '
However, a guaranteed right to buy broadcast time for political
advertisements (demanded by plaintiffs in Democratic National Committee) "would intrude unnecessarily" upon editorial discretion.m
In League of Women Voters, the Court held that section 399
was not sufficiently tailored to further what the government

ers,117

117.
1n8.
19.
120.
121.

- US,--,104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
47 U.S.C. § 399 (1983).
IC
- U.. at -- 104 S. Ct. at 3116 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.
S. Ct. at 3118.
- US. at-104

367, 389 (1969)).

122. ISE
123. -

U.

at

-

104 S. Ct. at 3117 (quoting Columbia Broa&ating Sstem, 453

US. at 896-97).
124. - US.at-

104 S C. at 3117.
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asserted as a substantial interest, nor did the section substantially advance the asserted interest.125
It is worth noting that the Court acknowledged that the spectrum scarcity rationale for regulation of broadcasting may have
been rendered obsolete by the advent of cable and satellite
technology.1- 8 However, the Court refused to consider the argument that technological developments have advanced so far
that some revision of broadcast regulation is required.'- It expressly declined to examine whether competition from cable
and satellite have ameliorated the impact of allocating a very
limited number of broadcast frequencies in any given locality
on the diversity of viewpoints available via the television set.
In contrast to the cases involving broadcasters, the Supreme
Court took an unequivocal and unanimous stance against access
requirements imposed on newspapers. In Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornillo,m the Court examined the constitutionality of a Florida statute requiring any newspaper that printed
an editorial attack on a political candidate's character or record
to provide that candidate with an opportunity to reply at no
charge. Tornillo argued that the statute did not restrict freedom of speech because the newspaper could say anything it
wished.m The Court rejected this argument, stating that "compelling editors or publishers to publish that which 'reason' tells
them should not be published is what is at issue in this case."'3
The Court then specified three separate ways in which the
statute violated the first amendment. First, the right of reply
created an economic burden triggered by the newspaper's content.'-" Second, this content-based penalty could chill editorial

discretion. 13 Third,

[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forego
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the first amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A
newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
125. - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3122-26.
126. - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3116, n. 11.
127. 1&
128. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
129. IS at 256.
130. I&
131. Id.at 256-57.
132. Id. at 257.
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news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials--whether fair or unfair--constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment.'=
This third argument is particularly important when examining
the constitutionality of legally mandated access channels on
cable television.
C.

Reconciling Cable and Related Cases

Most of the earlier cases on cable television consider whether
cable television should be analogized more closely to newspapers or to broadcasting. Not only is it difficult to place cable on
a continuum between the print and broadcast media, but the
first amendment position of broadcasters seems to be in a state
of flux. More importantly, the technology of cable (and the
competing media) continues to change. Thus, it has been difficult for lower courts to rule on cable's prerogatives under the
first amendment. When the issue of cable's status under the
first amendment eventually reaches the Supreme Court, the
Justices will have to balance the competing first amendment
interests in light of the continually changing technology of
cable and competing media.
There are several first amendment interests involved in the
regulation of cable television. Clearly, the owner of a cable television system has a first amendment interest in expressing his
or her views over the cable system, much as does the publisher
or producer in any other medium. Of particular importance,
then, is the owner's editorial discretion in what to offer, when,
and on which channels.
Viewers have a first amendment interest in receiving programming that has not been censored, abridged, or otherwise
inhibited by government influence. Further, it has been argued
that viewers have a first amendment interest in hearing a diversity of speakers (and, hopefully, a diversity of viewpoints)
over any particular medium. Likewise, it is argued that those
who wish to speak have a first amendment interest in being
given access to the channels of mass communication. -4 This
can be interpreted to mean that government has an affirmative
1.

I

at 25

13 See, eg., Barn, Accem to the Pres-A New
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).

rst Amendment Right, 8D
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duty to protect diversity in the media through such regulations
as access requirements. 1' How, then, does such an interest
arise? Since the first amendment simply decrees that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press,"1 ' the duty, or even power, of government to
act to promote diversity must stem from some action that the
government has the power to take. Governmental regulation is
a practical prerequisite to speech through broadcasting. Without some allocation of frequencies, signals would overlap and
clear signal reception would not be possible. Once government
has interfered with the market in an attempt to solve the problem of physical scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the market
forces that govern the other media are no longer operative; the
public cannot automatically pay for and receive a diversity of
viewpoints or speakers. To correct this situation, government
is allowed some power to regulate in order to promote
diversity.'3
In the context of cable television, a more fundamental question must be asked-is the physical scarcity argument even applicable? Under existing technology, clearly not.lss Of course,
there are physical limitations to any resource; but as long as the
economics are such that the supply will in practice never be
exhausted, physical scarcity does not exist. If broadcasting
were a natural economic monopoly, there would only be one
broadcaster in any given area and therefore no problem with
physical scarcity."' Currently, there are no physical barriers to
the construction of as many cable systems as an area is able to
support. Although technology or demand could change this,
regulation before the problem has been proven to exist is improper. If physical scarcity is the basis for government regulation of a medium, regulation when there is no proven scarcity
violates the first amendment.
If cable is a natural monopoly rather than a monopoly created by municipal regulation, would regulations such as access
requirements, exclusive franchises, and franchise fees be legiti135. Id
136. U.S. CONST. amend. L
137. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
138. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035,
1038 (D. Colo. 1980) for a discussion of physical scarcity.
139. This is not quite precise, since there could still be overlapping signals on the
periphery of signal reception areas. However, only a small number of frequencies
would be required to eliminate this problem.
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mate exercises of governmental power? In other words, does
economic scarcity vest in the government the power to promote
diversity? The opinion in Miami Herald indicates that it does
not. 140
Relying on Red Lion, the Tenth Circuit viewed "natural monopoly [as] a constitutionally permissible justification for some
degree" of cable television regulation. 1" That court distinguished Miami Heraldas involving "newspapers, a communication medium protected by a long-standing and powerful
tradition of keeping government's hands off as the best way to
achieve" open discussion on public issues. 42 The fallacy of the
court's argument has been ably noted by other commentators."4 3 The Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications said
the "distinction merely begs the question."'" If freedom of
speech over a medium depends on tradition, then with continually developing technology we might see a future with little or
no freedom of speech or press. The Supreme Court indicated
recently in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent" ' that there is no traditional right to use utility poles for
communication.'" Perhaps the court in Boulder II had this notion in mind.
The court in PreferredCommunications,however, explained
that "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a par47
While the posting of
ticular place at a particular time.""1
campaign bills and advertisements on utility poles did not meet
this test in Vincent, 48 the Ninth Circuit distinguished Vincent
by holding that stringing cable is compatible with the normal
use of utility poles. 149 Moreover, the court said that because the
poles are regularly made available to some cable operators, this
140. 418 U.S. at 249-58.
141. Boulder II, 660 F.2d at 1379. The Seventh Circuit seems to be in agreement.
See Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, supra note 89 at 128.
142. 660 F.2d at 1379.
143. Lee, Cable Franchisingand the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L REV. 867, 88889, 925-26 (1983); Stanzler, Cable Television Monopoly and the FirstAmendment, 4
CARDOZO

144.
145.
146.
147.

L. REV. 199, 218-228 (1983).

754 F.2d at 1405 n.
- U.S. -. 104 S.Ct. 2118 (1984).
Id. at 2134.
754 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116

(1972)).
148. - U.S. at ---104 S.CL at 2134 (1984).

149. 754 F.2d at 1408.
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makes the poles a public forum for cable. Therefore, "the City
must content itself with uniformly applying to all applicants
regulations tailored to minimize the burden on public resources
and to grant franchises to all cable operators who are willing to
satisfy the City's legitimate conditions."'
In sum, the bases suggested for giving cable television a
lesser status than newspapers under the first amendment are
invalid. Physical scarcity is not currently a problem for cable,
and possibly never will be. Cable is no more a common carrier
for transmitting programming produced by others than are
newspapers common carriers for publishing syndicated columns. Further, economic scarcity is not a permissible basis for
regulating a medium of mass communication. Cable is an expansive medium, not a scarce one. Thus, the appropriate tests
to be applied to regulations affecting cable are the traditional
ones. If the regulation is not content-related, it must be narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest. 51
If the regulation is content-related, then it must be necessary to
protect a compelling governmental interest. 152
After a review of the CCPA, Part IV of this article will examine the interests that are involved in cable television, and
analyze the factors that must be considered in order to fashion
an appropriate test for regulations affecting cable television
owners' freedom of expression.

III
Legislative History
The CCPA is the culmination of several attempts by Congress to enact cable legislation. Senator Goldwater introduced
legislation pertaining to cable in 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.11
Hearings were held only on the last of these. Apparently because of lack of time, however, the bill was not debated by the
full Senate prior to adjournment of the 97th Congress."
Goldwater introduced substantially the same bill as S.66 in
150. Id. at 1409. The court also explained that "an otherwise invalid restriction on
protected activity is not saved by the availability of other means of expression," and
the City may not point to the existence of access channels to legitimize its restrictions
on the cable market. Id. at 1410.
151. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1983).
152. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
153. S. REP. No. 67, supra note 13, at 12-13.
154. Id. at 13.
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January, 1983.m This bill provided a regulatory scheme for
cable television at the federal, state, and local levels. Among
the major provisions of the bill were:
a) a ban of prohibitions on cross-ownership between cable
television systems and other media;'5
b) requirements that channels be dedicated by the operators for public, educational, and governmental use;" 7
c) regulation by the franchising authority of the rates
charged by the cable operator for basic cable services;'"
d) limits on franchise fees, to be determined by the FCC;'5
e) standards for renewal of franchises;' 60
f) a prohibition against a state or local government or governmental agency acquiring an interest in a cable television system at less than fair market value;' 6 ' and
g) provisions to protect subscriber privacy.'2
Hearings were held,' but the ensuing changes in the bill
were more the result of negotiations between the two major
interest groups than of the hearings. The first of these interest
groups, the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), is
an industry association and the major lobbying body for cable
television operators."" The other group, the National League
of Cities (NLC), is an association of municipal corporations.
These two organizations held a series of meetings at which they
reached agreement as to what the bill should contain.'6 The
legislation was rewritten accordingly, and in March, 1983, Senator Goldwater offered the revised version as an amendment in
the nature of a substitute.'6
This was the first of many agreements to break down. On
April 1, the National League of Cities withdrew its support of
the bill. 1'7 After another series of meetings and negotiations,
155.
156.
157.
18.

Id.
Senate Hearing,aupra note 23, at 9-10.
Id.
Id.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. I. at 18-20.

162. I at n.
163. Senate Hearing, upra note 23.
164. There is another association, the Community Antenna Television Association,
which represents mostly small cable television stems.
165.
REP. No. 67, supranote 13, at 13.
16. 1
167. Id
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the NCTA agreed to virtually all of the changes requested by
the NLC.' These changes were incorporated into S.66, which
passed the full Senate on June 14, 1983.16
The legislation at this point differed from the bill originally
introduced in the following important ways:
a) access channels could be required by the franchising authority as part of the request for proposals;170
b) provisions were added allowing the operator to increase
rates charged for basic services according to a specific
7
formula;' '

c) a ceiling of five percent of a cable operator's gross reve72
nues on franchise fees was included;1
d) a presumption was created in favor of the renewal of
73
franchises;

e) no new cable system could provide cable service without
a franchise; 74 and
f) no governmental authority would be permitted to regulate a cable television operator as a common carrier to the extent that the system provided more than telephone service. 73
H.R. 4103, a version of S.66, was introduced in the House of
Representatives and passed the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee in November,
1983, before running into similar problems.'76 Another interest
group, the United States Conference of Mayors, had opposed
the bill, and the NLC decided to withdraw its support.' T7 At
the urging of Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman
John Dingell, another long bargaining session began until a
compromise was reached in late May, 1984.178 Under the new
agreement, there would be no presumption of renewal and the
definition of basic cable service, for which the rates could be
regulated, was broadened. 179 On the other hand, those rates
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 14.
S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S8325 (daily ed. June 14, 1983).
Id. at §606; see also id. at S8328 § 613.
Id S8326-8327 at § 607(b)(1).
Id. at S8327, § 608(b)(1).
Id at S8327, § 609(a).
Id. at S8325, § 604(3).
Id. at S8328, § 614.
BROADCASTING, June 4, 1984, at 39.
Id at 41.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
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could only be regulated for four years" s°
Consensus among these parties broke down once again. In
June, 1984, the Supreme Court held that FCC regulations governing cable signal carriage preempted an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting cable operators from retransmitting out-of-state
signals containing alcoholic beverage commercials.'"' The
NCTA interpreted this as reaffirming an FCC decision supporting deregulation of cable rates, 8 2 and reasoned that it might be
as well off if the bill did not pass.'" After holding out all summer, and with the end of the 98th Congress rapidly approaching, the cities agreed to begin new negotiations. The agreement
that resulted was slightly more favorable to cable operators,'"'
but involved no changes likely to affect the bill's constitutionality. This series of negotiations reveals an industry lobby that
has continually shown little regard for the importance of freedom of the press. To be fair, some cable operators consistently
opposed the bill."" The majority of the industry, however, supported the legislation, probably hoping that it would protect the
government-created monopolies under which most cable systems operate.
Perhaps if more interest groups were actively involved and
represented, the resulting legislation would have reflected
long-term social goals instead of short-term economies for cities
and cable operators. As Monroe Price, Dean of Cardozo Law
School, remarked at a seminar on the bill, "[t]he present situation is a remarkable delegation to private parties with Congress
saying to the cities and cable industry, 'sit down and decide
what you want, and we will pass it.' ,'6

IV
Analysis of the CCPA
Now that Congress, and not merely the FCC or the states,
has established a framework for cable television regulation,
challenges to that framework must be made on constitutional
180. 1l
181. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, - U.S. --,104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
182. BROADCASTING, Aug. 13, 1954, at 42 (discussing In re Community Cable Television, FCC No. 83-525 (Nov. 15, 1983)).

183. 1d
184. See

BROADCASMNG, Oct. 1,

1984, at 3940.

185. IS
18. BROADCAStIG, Sept. 24, 1984, at 89.
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grounds. There is always a danger in interpreting the Constitution, however, for the changes that are made have long-run and
profound effects. This is particularly true in the area of the
first amendment, because the amendment serves to protect the
essence of democracy-freedom of political expression. In determining the first amendment status of a major medium such
as cable, we must proceed with great caution. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has demonstrated its caution by avoiding the
issue entirely.
A. Access Requirements
The CCPA provisions requiring a cable operator to make
channels available for commercial (or leased) use by others and
allowing the forced donation of channel time for public, educational, and governmental access as a condition to receiving a
franchise are apparently based on the rationale that cable operates as a monopoly.m Indeed, the House committee report
characterizes cable as a "bottleneck" facility,' arguing that
"structural regulation," such as that governing broadcasting
and common carriers, may be applied to cable.8'9
The report attempts to distinguish Miami Herald as a case
involving the chilling of editorial discretion; because cable access channels are mere conduits, such access requirements do
l° The
not deprive cable operators of their free speech rights.1
report's reasoning is circular. Removing channels from the
control of cable system operators necessarily places a burden
on the operator as a condition to exercising his right to speak.
The Miami Herald decision expressly forbids this result. 91 It
is only because of the access requirements that the operators
are conduits with respect to those channels. The report's reliance on Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission,' to support structural regulation of media is misplaced.
It overlooks the Court's express limitation of the ruling to instances in which the newspaper had chosen to act as a conduit.19 The Court indicated that its decision did not authorize
"any restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on sto187. See H. REP. No. 934, aupra note 1, at 30-38 (1984).
188. IM at 33. This label is neither explained nor supported.
189. Id. at 32-36.

190. IdS at 34-35.
191. 418 U.S. at 259. See supra text accompanying notes 1233.
192. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
193. I& at 391.
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ries or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors."1'
Nevertheless, the Committee's concern that economic scarcity in cable can lead to a lack of diversity of viewpoints over
the medium and a reduction in the number of local outlets for
expression merits a discussion of whether such a concern provides a sound basis for access channel requirements. Perhaps if
a complete domination of the "marketplace of ideas" could be
demonstrated, regulation to foster access and diversity of
speakers and viewpoints would be permissible.
First, it would be 'necessary to establish that cable television
is a natural monopoly. One way to accomplish this would be to
consider the average total costs (ATC) of a cable system. If the
ATC curve is declining, then a larger plant size is favorable and
one operator will become the monopolist.195 A recent study indicates that the ATC for cable systems does in fact decrease
with the size of the cable system.lcc
Second, it would be necessary to demonstrate that entry into
the market is very expensive and that once a cable operator
becomes established, it is essentially impossible to replace him,
even by market choice. Otherwise, one could argue, as did the
Supreme Court in Miami Herald, that the monopolist's position is the result of a free market choice by the public (assuming no government involvement in the selection of the cable
operator).I 9
Third, it would be necessary to show that cable television already is, and is likely to remain, the dominant medium of mass
communication in the given locality. If a medium has a small
audience, it is difficult to argue that even complete monopolization of that medium by a private interest is grounds for regulation. Viewers would still have abundant opportunities to get
information, ideas or entertainment from other media; thus,
there would be no need to regulate to "protect" the marketplace of ideas. While cable penetration does exceed seventy
percent in some cities, one would still need to examine the
194. I& The Court in that case upheld a bar against employment advertising specifying "male" or "female" preference.
195. G. WEBB, sup,u note 9, at 41-42.
196. I at 41-65. This conclusion is based on a model that might not be sufficiently
accurate in all localities. Add to this the possibility of a changing cost structure due to
changing technology, and a case-by-case approach to determination of costs seems
most appropriate.
1M7. 416 US. at 248-49.
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availability of, and potential developments in, other media,
such as newspapers, magazines and the many competing electronic media.
Fourth, it would be necessary to establish that the existing
cable system did not provide access to users on a nondiscriminatory basis. If the operator does provide such access, government involvement would be unnecessary, and therefore,
impermissible.'
In sum, to demonstrate a complete domination of the marketplace of ideas, it would have to be shown that the status quo
is so adverse to open discussion of diverse opinions that there is
essentially no effective forum for public expression. In other
words, a market "failure" far more severe than that contemplated in Miami Herald could give rise to a substantial, if not
compelling, governmental interest in protecting freedom of expression. Only if such a complete failure existed, however,
would courts have to undertake the extremely difficult task of
balancing the competing first amendment interests.
The cable operator's first amendment interests are clearly
abridged by any law requiring the operator to provide free or
leased access channels. Free access channels require the operator to subsidize someone else's speech as a condition of exercising his own."' Leased access channels remove the operator's
editorial discretion over those channels." In order to balance
the interests involved, however, we need to ask how much the
operator's rights are being abridged. How great is the financial
burden on the operator? If free access channels constitute an
economic loss to the cable operator, is the owner's ability to
speak reduced in terms of quantity, quality, or both? How
great a loss of editorial discretion does the operator suffer by
not being permitted to program on the access channels? But
should these concerns matter? Whether the channel time is
donated or leased, the operator is being compelled to do something that runs counter to the central foundation underlying
freedom of the press: he is required to promote someone else's
views. In an attempt to compensate for this, the operator may
198. See supra text accompanying notes 115-29.
199. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978).
200. I See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
This is also true for free access channels, although to make matters worse, the operator is generally required to censor the content of the material on the public access
channels. See 47 C.F.P § 76215 (1984).
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feel compelled to change other programming on the cable system.2° This only results in a further loss of editorial discretion.
Both cable system operators and the general public have an
interest in protecting editorial discretion. In addition, under
the severe economic scarcity scenario, it can be argued that the
public also has an interest in hearing a diversity of speakers
over the cable system, and that this interest must be balanced
against the interest in editorial discretion. Moreover, if those
who wish to speak are unable to do so because cable is the only
effective forum, then their rights should also be balanced
against those of the cable operator. The weight accorded the
interests in diversity and access will vary with the degree of
economic scarcity: the more severe the scarcity, the stronger
the argument in favor of access requirements.
Thus, it is difficult to use economic scarcity, or natural monopoly, as a basis for the regulation of cable television. In
weighing competing interests, quantitative measurements of
"value" or "importance" are difficult, if not impossible, to
make. Qualitative assessments are also susceptible to serious
error. Moreover, this type of approach is unnecessary. As will
be explained later in this article, current laws other than the
CCPA are adequate to handle the problems envisioned by
would-be regulators.
An examination of the provisions of the CCPA raises additional questions about the Act's constitutionality. Section 611
allows a franchising authority to require the franchisee to provide "channel capacity for public, educational, or governmental
[(PEG)] use. ''co2 The franchising authority may also require the
cable operator to provide an "institutional network," separate
from the cable operator's revenue-producing network, for educational and governmental use.m These requirements run
awry of the first amendment by eliminating the editorial discretion of the cable operator over the PEG access channels. °4
These provisions are also inconsistent with the first amendment because they require the operator to subsidize the speech
20L In San Francisco, Viacom Cablevision has felt it necessary to arrange for programming to counter the 'Race and Reason" series produced by the White American
Resistance and shown on Viacom's public access channel. N. CaL Jewish Bulletin,
Nov. 9, 1984, at 1, 12.
202. Pub. L No. 98549, at § 611(a), 1984 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)

2779.
2D& Id at § 611(f).
204 See aupm text accompanying notes 113-15.
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of others as a condition to the operator exercising his or her
own right to speak. °
Section 612 of the Act requires cable operators to designate a
prescribed number of channels (depending on the number of
channels available on the cable system) for leased, commercial
use.2° Here again, the editorial discretion of the operator is
abridged. 2 Moreover, the operator is expected to police these
leased channels to prevent the broadcast of any cable service
which, "in the judgment of the franchising authority is obscene,
or is in conflict with community standards in that it is lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution of the United States."'12 " Thus, the cable operator
is supposed to act as censor for the franchising authority.' °
This has already proven to put operators in a difficult position.2 0 Not only does this violate the rights of the operator, but
the rights of the viewer, as well. That "indecent" speech may
be subjected to regulation over broadcast media does not mean
the same speech may be regulated on cable television.2 11 For

these reasons, section 612 is also unconstitutional.
B. Requirement of a Franchise
Perhaps the most egregious violation of the first amendment
found in the Act is the requirement that "a cable operator may
not provide cable service without a franchise."212 This allows a
municipality or other franchising authority to exclude those
who would be otherwise willing to operate and compete in the
given community. No standards or criteria are given for the
denial of a franchise. Presumably, a city could decide not to
grant a franchise to a cable operator on the basis of the size of
205. 1&
206. Pub. L No. 98-549, at § 612,1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
207. Since the mandated number of commercial access channels varies with the
size of the cable system, the restraint on editorial discretion falls into the category of
restraints held unconsitutional in GrosJean v. American Press Co., 197 U.S. 233 (1936)
(state tax on advertising revenues applying only to newspapers over a certain size
held unconstitutional).
208. Pub. L No. 98-549, at § 612(h), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
209. Section 624(d) of the Act allows the franchise agreement to specify that obscene or otherwise unprotected speech shall not be provided.
210. See suprm note 180.
211. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982); see also Lee, aupra note 143, at 902-05.
212. See Pub. L.No. 98-549, § 621(b)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98

Stat.) 2779.
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the proposed system, the number of channels offered, the proposed rates, the number of access channels offered, or even the
programming to be offered. The Act does prohibit "requirements regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as expressly provided in this title. ' 21 3 That, however, is
not the same as prohibiting discrimination between potential
franchisees on the basis of program offerings. Franchising is a
subjective process. The decision of the franchising authority
may well be swayed by the appeal of the proposed programming to the decision-makers.
The requirement has serious first amendment implications.
First, the cable operator who fails to convince the franchising
authority that a franchise should be granted to him or her (or,
more realistically under current practice, that the operator is
the "best" applicant for a franchise) is prevented from speaking
in that community. This is a denial of the operator's rights and
a denial of the public's right to choose to whom they may listen.2 14 Second, any discrimination between cable operators
who meet all technical and safety standards might influence
the content of the speech provided by the franchise winner.
How else may a cable operator legally succeed in obtaining a
franchise but by offering what the franchising authority feels is
the most desirable proposal? Editorial discretion is sacrificed
by the cable operator, and the public has lost an opportunity to
view an uninhibited medium of expression. Finally, as a result
of the franchising process, the franchising authority may
choose a more expensive system than the community is willing
to pay for and deny franchises for systems that are more
appropriate.=
These perils to first amendment freedoms may arise either
when the franchising authority indicates in some manner what
it prefers, or when the cable operator tailors its proposal to
what it perceives as desired. In either case, free expression is
abridged, and the failure is the result of an Act which purports
to legitimize this system of franchising. Nor can the system be
remedied as long as the franchising authority is permitted to
213. Id. at § 624(f)(1).

214. The specter of extortion and bribery also arises, witness the grand jury indict,
ment of two members of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen on charges of extorting
stock and money from two cable television companies bidding for the city's franchise.
Los Angeles Daily Journal, Nov. 16, 1984, at 3. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943).
21. I. REP. No. 9K supra note 1, at 21 (1984).
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predetermine the number of applicants it will franchise. The
renewal provisions of the Act illustrate this.216 They reflect a
successful attempt by the NCTA to inject certain criteria into
the renewal process. 17 While one criterion pertaining to the
quality of the operator's service is to be applied "without regard
to the mix, quality, or level of cable services or other services
provided over the system,"'218

another criterion considers

whether "the operator's proposal is reasonable to meet the future cable-related community needs and interests, taking into
account the costs of meeting such needs and interests.

2

19

This

criterion cannot be applied consistently with the first amendment. Is freedom of the press conditioned upon meeting "community needs and interests"? That was the position of the
House Energy and Commerce Commmittee. In its report, the
Committee stated that "the operator's responsibility is to provide those facilities and services which can be shown to be in
the interests of the community to receive in view of the costs
This process of selecting the "best" applicant, howthereof."
ever, was labeled "clearly invalid" by the Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications.22 The court also disagreed with the
House Committee's assertion that the Act gave the franchising
authority discretion to determine the number of cable operators allowed to provide service in a particular area.22
Is it even possible for a governmental body to dictate what
the community's needs and interests in mass media are? Is it
not the purpose of the first amendment to prohibit exactly that
process? Unless the standards for review of franchise applications and renewals are limited to safety and technical standards, and all who meet the standards are allowed to enter the
market, the franchising process will remain constitutionally
impermissible.
C. Franchise Fees
Section 622 of the Act authorizes a franchising authority to
charge a fee in the amount of five percent of the cable opera216. Pub. L No. 98-549, § 626, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs (98 Stat.) 2779.
217. See supr Part II.
218. Pub. L No. 98-549, § 626(c)(1)(B), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98
Stat.) 2779.
219. Id at § 626(c)(1)(D).
220. H. REP. No. 934, supra note 1, at 74.
221. 754 F.2d at 1409.
222. Id at 1410.
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tor's gross revenues derived from the operation of the particular cable system.2 This is presumably to offset the costs to the
community in regulating cable.2 This provision of the Act is
also constitutionally invalid. In MinneapolisStar and Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,225 the Supreme
Court reviewed a tax which effectively singled out the press for
special treatment. The Court held the tax to be unconstitutional, saying "[d]ifferential taxation of the press ... places
such a burden on the interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such a treatment unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation."' m
Minnesota asserted an interest in raising revenue. The Court
said this interest, standing alone, could not justify special treatment of the press.m
This holding was recently applied by the California Court of
Appeal to a case involving a three percent tax on the subscription fees of a MDS system.m In that case, the City of Alameda
imposed the tax on Premier Communications for the purpose
of raising revenue. 2 9 The court noted that "[t]here is no doubt
that Premier, as a disseminator of motion pictures, news and
other information and entertainment programming, engages in
conduct protected by the First Amendment guaranties of freedom of speech and press.,2" Then, after discussing Minneapolis Star, the court found that revenue-raising purposes could
not justify the "differentially more burdensome" tax (compared to other businesses) applied to Premier. 23 '
Short of even suggesting a revenue-raising motive for
franchise fees, the CCPA fails to establish any compelling governmental interest in applying a five-percent tax or fee on
223. Pub. L. No. 98-594, § 622, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779.
224. S. REP. No. 67, supra note 13, at 25. Note, however, that the costs of regulating the operations of a cable system would likely be based on impermissible regulatory activities: monitoring the performance of the franchise under the franchise
agreement, the use of the access channels, the renewal process (where there is no
renewal fee) and the regulation of rates (for the next two years).
225. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
226. 565 US. at 585.

227. I& at 586.
228. City of Alameda v. Premier Communications Network, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d
148, 202 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1984).
229. Id at 152-5, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 68&
230. Id at 153, 202 CaL Rptr. at 68&
231. Id at 155-57, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 687689.
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cable television. Such a fee is significantly higher than what is
usually charged to users of public right-of-ways.m Moreover,
the House Report specifically notes that "any tax of general applicability" or any tax that does "not unduly discriminate
against the cable operator so as to effectively constitute a tax
directed at the cable system" is not included within the fivepercent fee ceiling.m The costs of the franchising process are
typically included in the application fee.2" How then does the
franchise fee relate to legitimate costs incurred by the city on
account of the cable television system? Under Minneapolis
Star, the franchising authority has to prove its costs, thereby
establishing the compelling governmental interest to be protected by the fee.m With regard to the CCPA, it appears that
the fees established by the Act are primarily profit for the cities,2 and as such, they violate the first amendment.

V
Conclusion
It is understandable that local governments and cable industry representatives should want to codify common practices.
Under the CCPA, franchising authorities are able to control
the local market for cable television, thereby gaining considerable influence over the structure of the cable system and the
content of the cable programming.m Local government also
profits by collecting five percent of the gross revenue from the
operation of the cable system.= In exchange, the cable operator is effectively protected from competition. The operator
desires this because competition between cable systems in the
same area decreases the prices the operator can charge in a monopoly situation, thereby reducing the revenues generated by
any one cable system. This in turn decreases the amount a
cable system operator can concede (in terms of system structure, free channels, institutional networks and franchise fees)
232. See, e.g., 12 MCQnU!.LN, THE LAW OF MumciPAL CORPoRATONS, § 34.82 (rev.
3d ed. 1970).
233. L REP. No. 934, supra note 1, at 64.
234. See, e.g., Baer, oupra note 9, at 84 (using Louisville ordinance establishing a
request for proposals).
235. 565 U.S. 575, 585.
236. Baer, supra note 9, at 132 ("many cities view cable television as merely another source of revenue").
237. See aupra text accompanying notes 191-99.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01.
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to the local government when bidding to obtain a franchise.
Therefore, in the short-run, cable system operators favor the
new legislation.
In the long-run, however, competition from other electronic
media, such as a combination of DBS and SMATV systems,
may cause cable operators to regret their burdened position.
The protection offered by municipalities will not be worth the
concessions made by the operators if the cable systems have to
compete on a large scale with, one would hope, less regulated
alternative electronic media.
Regardless of the impact on operating cable systems, the big
losers under the CCPA are the public and the cable system operators who are excluded from the market. Those who wish to
speak are prohibited by government (rather than by economic
or physical limitations) from speaking over a particular medium, and this is clearly an infringement of freedom of speech
and of the press.
Also of paramount importance is the principle that the public
should not have its sources of information selected by the government. The system of exclusively government-sponsored
speakers selected by municipal governments is a malignancy
that could spread to other media. If the Supreme Court upholds the Tenth Circuit's "tradition"-oriented rationale for regulating a medium,m the tumor of government control is
certain to spread.

Monopoly due to non-economic forces, however, is still a potential concern. If cable somehow came to dominate a local media market, would there be a viable mechanism for promoting
diversity of viewpoints? There are two effective and practical
solutions.
The first is to use the antitrust laws as they have been applied to the press.20 The antitrust laws can serve as a practical
tool for maintaining diversity and preventing monopolization
where monopolization is not the result of natural economic
forces. This was the approach taken by the district court in
Boulder Im' and Boukler I,2 and embraced by the Seventh
239. See eupra text accompanying notes 122-27.
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See Associated Press v. United States, 326 US. 1, 20

(1945): 'Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not Dust] for some."
241. 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Col. 1980).

241 496 F. Supm 823 (D. Colo. 1980).
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Circuit in Omega Satellite Products. s Once competitive bidding as a means of selecting those to be licensed to speak is
recognized as violative of' the first amendment, the antitrust
laws become more effective in promoting competition (at least
in allowing the public to choose to whom to listen). Additionally, the antitrust laws are a more appropriate solution than the
uniform scheme presented by the CCPA because antitrust law
can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Competition for the
market is always possible, even if the result is a monopoly.
Where continued competition within the market is possible, the
CCPA scheme is unnecessary. Instead, if anticompetitive practices are engaged in, the antitrust laws step in to promote both
competition and diversity.
Where cable is found to embody a natural monopoly, there
remains a far more effective and less intrusive means to accomplish diversity than that presented in the statute: municipallyfinanced cable systems. If the people, through their elected
representatives, wish to assure diversity of speakers over cable
television, it is absolutely unnecessary to force an existing or
potential operator to donate or sell a portion of its channel
space. The municipality itself can construct a small, low-cost
cable system and provide channel time on the same terms the
CCPA has private operators do. This would avoid intrusion
into the operator's editorial discretion and does not tax the operator for exercising his right to speak. It also avoids the problem of asking the operator to censor obscene, indecent or
commercial speech from the public access channels. In fact, the
municipalities themselves should leave enforcement of such
rules to the courts.
Another advantage of the municipally financed system is
that it can be extended to those areas of the municipality that
are not served by the existing cable systems. If the local government is truly interested in promoting diversity of viewpoints for the benefit of the community, that benefit should be
offered to the entire community and not just to selected areas.
In addition, the municipal system could be partially financed by
charging those who use channel time.
Nevertheless, as long as municipalities are not required to
pay for something because they are allowed to receive it at
someone else's expense, there will be little incentive for them
243. 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
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to spend the money to build even a simple cable system. Moreover, there is no need at present to ensure diversity, nor has it
been demonstrated that there will ever be such a need. The
electronic media which compete with cable are continuing to
develop. Cable television itself has changed enormously in
character and function over the past fifteen years. Given these
developments, the Supreme Court has chosen perhaps the wisest policy of all by refraining from establishing a rule on the
first amendment status of cable television. However, the issue
becomes more difficult to avoid once constitutionally questionable practices are condoned by statute. As long as the CCPA
remains the law, the public will unnecessarily countenance a
regulated and encumbered medium. The individual members
of the public, via the market, should decide what services to
receive, how much to pay for those services and to whom to
listen. That approach will best promote, as it has in the past,

the goals of freedom of speech and of the press.

